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ESSAY: 
THE GRAND POOBAH AND GORILLAS IN 
OUR MIDST: ENHANCING CIVIL JUSTICE 
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS—SWAPPING 
DISCOVERY PROCEDURES IN THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE AND OTHER REFORMS LIKE 
TRIAL BY AGREEMENT 
Mark W. Bennett* 
ABSTRACT 
Most commentators agree that the vanishing plaintiff and the vanishing civil 
jury trial in federal courts are primarily the result of the skyrocketing costs of lit-
igation, especially discovery. I agree, but stand virtually alone in my view that the 
root of the problems and any solutions lie in the distinction between “trial law-
yers” and “litigators.” The rise of the “litigation industry” fueled by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and driven by the leveraging of litigation law firms, has 
become the eight hundred pound gorilla in our “midst.” So-called “experts” on 
discovery and the Rules have been writing about, tinkering with, and nibbling at 
the edges of the Rules since their passage in 1938—and the system is now more 
broken than ever. It is no coincidence that the demographics of the Judicial Con-
ference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has been, and continues to be, domi-
nated by judges, lawyers, and law professors with primarily “Big Law” litigation 
experience. 
Reducing cost and delay and increasing the role of trial by jury requires 
bold action. After being anointed the Grand Poobah of the Federal Courts for a 
day—my primary cure—strong medicine indeed—is to switch the discovery par-
adigm for criminal and civil cases. By rule, federal criminal discovery depends 
almost exclusively on the mandatory disclosure requirements triggered by a sim-
ple request from the defendant. In practice, mandatory mutual disclosure takes 
place quickly with discovery motions being far rarer than in civil cases. There are 
no depositions, interrogatories, or requests for production of documents. On the 
other hand, in civil discovery, where usually money, rather than liberty, is at 
                                                        
*  Mark W. Bennett is in his twenty-first year as a U.S. district judge for the Northern Dis-
trict of Iowa. 
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stake, discovery is virtually wide open, extensive, expensive, and all too often a 
deep sea fishing expedition and battleground filled with obstructionist behavior 
on both sides. 
Recent proposed amendments to the civil discovery rules will likely have the 
unintended consequences of further increasing the cost of discovery while afford-
ing greater opportunities for litigators to launch obstructionist tactics, even in 
mine-run cases. Switching the discovery paradigms in civil and criminal cases to 
allow for more discovery in criminal cases and far more limited discovery in civil 
cases, with strong mandatory disclosure requirements, and severe remedies for 
violating them, will greatly further justice in both. So, too, would modifying the 
transsubstantive nature of federal civil procedure by adopting simple tracking, 
case protocols, and dispositive motion reform. Finally, promoting the emerging 
Trial By Agreement reform movement now is something that is critically im-
portant without waiting for cumbersome and historically unavailing federal civil 
rules reform. 
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The Hon. Mark W. Bennett 
U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa 
313 U.S. Courthouse 
320 Sixth Street 
Sioux City, IA 51101 
 
Re: Anointment as the First and Only Grand Poobah of the 
Federal Courts 
 
Dear Judge Bennett, 
 
We are ecstatic to announce that, after nearly 40 years of 
toiling in the cotton rows of the federal civil and criminal jus-
tice systems you have been anointed the first and only Grand 
Poobah of the Federal Courts. This special appointment gives 
you the right to make unilateral changes to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. However, you only have one day to do 
this. Please exercise this discretion wisely. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
The Grand Poobah of the Federal Courts Selection Committee 
Administrative Office of the Federal Courts 
One Columbus Circle, NE 
Washington, DC 20544 
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Mr. Ellsworth Cash 
Moore, Cash & Moore 
320 LaSalle St. 
Chicago, Ill. 60601 
 
Re: The Grand Poobah of the Federal Courts Decree 
 
Dear Ellsworth, 
 
As you know, you have been our lead litigator for over 
thirty years in all our federal litigation throughout the United 
States. We on the management team of Farnsworth Industries 
have never been more excited than we are to be the first civil 
case in the Southern District of New York subject to the 
Grand Poobah of the Federal Courts Decree to reduce the time 
and expense of federal civil litigation. We hail this new era of 
reform where we can get our case before a federal jury with-
out the unnecessary expense and delay of traditional massive 
discovery. You can expect our full cooperation in getting this 
commercial case to trial in the fourteen months from filing to 
its scheduled trial date. We are confident we will prevail and 
justice will be done. 
 
Best, 
 
Lionel Collins 
President & CEO 
Farnsworth Industries 
1776 Victory Blvd. 
Cleveland, OH 44112 
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CONFIDENTIAL MEMO 
 
 
From: Ellsworth Cash 
To: Moore, Cash & Moore Management Committee 
Re: The Grand Poobah of the Federal Courts Decree and 
Firm Income 
 
I regret to inform you that our latest piece of federal liti-
gation filed on behalf of Farnsworth Industries, our single 
largest cash cow client, is now the first case under the Grand 
Poobah of the Federal Courts Decree to reduce the time and 
expense of federal civil litigation. We would have normally 
budgeted $2,000,000+ in fees up to trial for Farnsworth Indus-
tries in this case and used a team of myself as the lead partner, 
four junior partners, and at least seven associates, and several 
contract attorneys. Like our other major litigation over the 
years for Farnsworth Industries, we would have been able to 
bill for close to four years before the case settled weeks before 
the trial date. Now we can no longer take the 40–50 deposi-
tions we used to take, file non-meritorious motions to dismiss 
and for summary judgment, and cat fight in discovery for 
three years. I need further direction as to how we can, in good 
faith, continue to over-staff this case and make the type of 
fees we are accustomed and entitled to. I think Collins would 
blow his top if we doubled our hourly rates. We need an 
emergency meeting of the Management Committee immedi-
ately! 
 
Ellsworth Cash1 
 
                                                        
1  The two letters and memo are fictitious. 
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Every great idea starts out as blasphemy.—Bertrand Russell 
Every blasphemy does not start as a great idea.—Mark W. Bennett 
INTRODUCTION 
A. The Grand Poobah 
The lofty position, Grand Poobah of the Federal Courts,2 held only for a 
single day, empowered me to propose unilateral changes in the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure (“Rules”). My proposed changes bear little resemblance to 
the “nibbling around the edges” that has been repeatedly suggested by scholars, 
judges, lawyers, and the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (“Committee”). 
Since their passage in 1938, the Rules have been amended a staggering thirty-
three times.3 Indeed, in 2015 the Rules face the passage of yet another round of 
nibbling amendments.4 Once again, the mantra for the 2015 proposed amend-
ments is exorcising the demons of exploding cost and excessive delay. More 
than twenty years ago, Professor Mengler, in commenting on the barely settled 
dust “on the discovery amendments of the Eighties” noted that “[o]ne’s nose 
need not travel too close to the federal courthouse to smell the aroma of litiga-
tion abuse.”5 He legitimately questioned whether “the cause of our discovery 
ills is ineffective rulemaking and whether the cure—if there is any—is more, or 
different, rules.”6 “Make no mistake about it: no competent lawyer would claim 
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attain their stated goal of ‘the just, 
                                                        
2  “The sobriquet ‘Grand Poobah’ comes from the imperious character Pooh-Bah, who held, 
among other titles, that of ‘Lord-High-Everything-Else,’ in Gilbert and Sullivan’s 1885 
opera The Mikado.” Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No 
Summary Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s 
Summary Judgment Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspec-
tive, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 686 n.3 (2012–2013). Pooh-Bah also spoke the following 
lines: “It is consequently my degrading duty to serve this upstart as First Lord of the Treas-
ury, Lord Chief Justice, Commander-in-Chief, Lord High Admiral, Master of the Buck 
Hounds, Groom of the Back Stairs, Archbishop of Titipu, and Lord Mayor, both acting and 
elect, all rolled into one.” ARTHUR SULLIVAN & W.S. GILBERT, THE MIKADO, act I. 
3  The Rules have been amended by Supreme Court Order in 1939, 1946, 1948, 1951, 1961, 
1963, 1966, 1967, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, 
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2013, 
and 2014. See FED. R. CIV. P. historical note (listing the dates of amendments to the Rules). 
4  COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE  
UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL  
RULES OF APPELLATE, BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3–4 (2014)  
[hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/preliminary-draft-proposed-amendments.pdf. 
5  Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Again 
Time for Reform, 138 F.R.D. 155, 155–56 (1992). I totally reject Professor Mengler’s pro-
posed solution that the cure is more judicial resources, including more judges and lighter 
caseloads. Id. at 165. 
6  Id. at 156. 
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speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.’ ”7 This 
essay argues it’s not more, but different and more effective amendments that 
are needed. I do not question the good faith aspirations and hard work of past 
Rules’ reformers. But, surely, “the aroma of litigation abuse” is more feculent 
now than ever.8 The proposals offered in this essay will be viewed by the true 
believers in the Rules,9 in the judiciary, the legal academy, the Bar, and espe-
cially the Committee, as blasphemous. That is fine. Given the backward-
looking nature of the legal profession, that is, perhaps, as it should be. Howev-
er, I take my Grand Poobah position earnestly, as I do my “outside-the-box” 
suggestions for major reform. I offer these changes in the spirit of Robert 
Browning’s immortal phrase: “Ah, but a [person’s] reach should exceed his [or 
her] grasp . . . .”10 After all, look where the prior decades of tinkering and nib-
bling have gotten us? While I had just that one day to propose my changes dis-
cussed in this essay, I have spent much of my professional life, as a lawyer, 
U.S. magistrate judge, and U.S. district judge thinking about ways to improve 
the federal justice system and save jury trials from extinction.11 
                                                        
7  James R. Maxeiner, Pleading and Access to Civil Procedure: Historical and Comparative 
Reflections on Iqbal, a Day in Court and a Decision According to Law, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 
1257, 1261 (2010). 
8  “Disproportionate cost and excessive delay are complaints often cited by lawyers, clients, 
judges, and the legal academy as the symptoms of a discovery system gone sour.” Timothy 
Wilson, Note, A Mandate for Failure: The Sedona Cooperation Proclamation and Modern 
Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 35 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 165, 170 
(2013) (footnotes omitted). 
9  On the fiftieth anniversary of the Rules, Professor Subrin observed: 
Many praised the Rules. Professor Geoffrey Hazard’s opening paragraph is illustrative: 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, whatever criticisms we might have of their 
details, have been a major triumph of law reform. They have served for 50 years sub-
stantially intact, a statement that can be made of few other pieces of major legislation in 
our era . . . . 
Professor David Shapiro noted that “[t]he Federal Rules have not just survived; they have 
influenced procedural thinking in every court in the land (and some in other lands), and have in-
deed become part of the consciousness of lawyers, judges, and scholars who worry about and 
live with issues of judicial procedure.” Professor Paul Carrington not only praised the Rules, but 
also staunchly defended the “aspiration for political neutrality in rulemaking” that he found as an 
underlying theme of the 1934 Rules Enabling Act. “The aspiration to neutrality is derived from 
and reinforced by the long tradition of judicial law reform giving rise to judicial rulemaking. 
That tradition descends from Roscoe Pound, David Dudley Field, Henry Brougham, Jeremy 
Bentham and unnumbered others who have labored in pursuit of the aims stated in Rule 1 for at 
least a century and a half.” 
Stephen N. Subrin, Fireworks on the 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 73 JUDICATURE 4, 4–5 (1989) [hereinafter Subrin, Fireworks on the 50th Anniversary] 
(footnotes omitted). 
10  Robert Browning, Andrea del Sarto, available at http://www.poetryfoundation.org 
/poem/173001. 
11  In 1991, I was appointed the first Chair of the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group 
for the Southern District of Iowa—a position I resigned when I was appointed a U.S. magis-
trate judge for the Southern District of Iowa later in 1991. In my two-plus-decade tenure as a 
federal district court judge, I have been assigned over 3700 civil cases in the Northern Dis-
trict of Iowa. I have also tried civil cases in the Southern District of Iowa, the District of Ari-
zona, the District of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Middle District of Florida, as well 
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One final introductory theme. This essay dramatically differs from prior 
critiques of reform of the Rules by its central emphasis on the difference be-
tween “litigators” and real trial lawyers. The essay argues that without an un-
derstanding of the ramifications of the differences between “litigators” and trial 
lawyers, meaningful reform of the Rules is impossible. In fact, it is this differ-
ence that drives the suggestion in the essay. Why others have failed to see the 
importance of this distinction is perplexing. Perhaps, I am totally wrong or oth-
ers have fallen victim to The Invisible Gorilla effect.12 In their now famous 
study, Gorillas in Our Midst, people are asked to count the number of aerial 
and bounce passes of a basketball during a short less-than-one-minute video.13 
While the basketball players on two teams are passing the basketball, 
“[h]alfway through the video, a female student wearing a full-body gorilla suit 
walked into the scene, stopped in the middle of the players, faced the camera, 
thumped her chest, and then walked off, spending about nine seconds on-
screen.”14 Often the results are the same: half the people did not recall even 
seeing the gorilla.15 Do others not see the impact of “litigators” and the “litiga-
tion industry,” the eight hundred pound chest-thumping gorillas, on excessive 
cost and delay in civil litigation? 
B. The Vanishing Civil Trials 
While jury trials are surely vanishing,16 there are no vanishing authors dis-
cussing the various aspects of civil procedure that affect whether the parties go 
to trial. No doubt thousands of law review articles have been written on the 
many aspects of federal civil procedure. One enterprising law student this year 
estimated that more than 2,500 law review articles discuss “the costs associated 
with discovery.”17 Tellingly, by 2010 the summary judgment trilogy Anderson, 
Celotex, and Matsushita (in that order) are the three most cited U.S. Supreme 
                                                                                                                                
as sitting by designation on the U.S. Courts of Appeals for both the Eighth and Ninth Cir-
cuits. 
12  See generally CHRISTOPHER CHABRIS & DANIEL SIMONS, THE INVISIBLE GORILLA: HOW 
OUR INTUITIONS DECEIVE US (2009). 
13  Id. at 5. 
14  Id. at 6. 
15  Id. 
16  “Today, in both the federal and state courts, civil jury trials are vanishingly rare.” Renée 
Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving Constitutional Rights to Civil Jury 
Trial, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 811, 813 (2014); see, e.g, Mark W. Bennett et al., Judg-
es’ Views on Vanishing Civil Trials, 88 JUDICATURE 306, 306 (2005); Marc Galanter, The 
Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 
1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004); John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil 
Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 524 (2012). 
17  Brian Morris, Note, The 2015 Proposals to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Prepar-
ing for the Future of Discovery, 41 N. KY. L. REV. 133, 133 (2014). 
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Court cases of all time in reported federal court decisions, and the pleading de-
cisions in Conley and Twombly are fourth and seventh.18 
Some articles, like those written by Professor Stephen N. Subrin at North-
eastern University School of Law,19 the honoree of this Symposium, have been 
incredibly informative, providing both historical insights that gave rise to the 
passage of the Rules in 1938, and forward thinking about the Rules’ many posi-
tive features and substantial pitfalls. Regrettably, these articles, especially Pro-
                                                        
18  Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1357 (2010) (citing 
Shepard’s data of federal court decisions as of March 17, 2010); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
19  Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Judith Olans Brown & Stephen N. Subrin, Substance in the 
Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cas-
es, 33 B.C. L. REV. 211 (1992); Judith Olans Brown, Stephen N. Subrin & Phyllis Tropper 
Baumann, Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment Discrimination Law: A 
Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487 (1997); Judith 
Olans Brown, Daniel J. Givelber & Stephen N. Subrin, Treating Blacks as If They Were 
White: Problems of Definition and Proof in Section 1982 Cases, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1 
(1975); Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a 
Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399 (2011) [hereinafter Burbank & 
Subrin, Litigation and Democracy]; Daniel R. Coquillette, Mary P. Squiers & Stephen N. 
Subrin, The Role of Local Rules, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 62 (1989); Stephen N. Subrin, A 
Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It’s Here to Stay and Much Better Than I Thought, 3 
NEV. L.J. 196 (2003); Steve Subrin, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Contempt for Rules, Statutes, the 
Constitution, and Elemental Fairness, 12 NEV. L.J. 571 (2012); Stephen N. Subrin, Discov-
ery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 299 (2002); Stephen N. 
Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging 
Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 (1989); Subrin, Fireworks on the 50th Anni-
versary, supra note 9; Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical 
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691 (1998); Stephen N. 
Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective Sub-
stance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27 (1994); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Con-
quered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 
U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law]; Ste-
phen N. Subrin & A. Richard Dykstra, Notice and the Right to Be Heard: The Significance 
of Old Friends, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 449 (1974); Stephen N. Subrin, On Thinking 
About a Description of a Country’s Civil Procedure, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 139 (1999); 
Stephen N. Subrin, Procedure, Politics, Prediction, and Professors: A Response to Profes-
sors Burbank and Purcell, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2151 (2008); Stephen N. Subrin, Reflections 
on the Twin Dreams of Simplified Procedure and Useful Empiricism, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 
173 (2007); Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate, 
59 BROOK. L. REV. 1155 (1993); Stephen N. Subrin, Preface to The 50th Anniversary of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1938–1988, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1873 (1989); Stephen N. 
Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Integration of Law and Fact in an Uncharted Parallel Pro-
cedural Universe, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1981 (2004); Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations 
of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 
87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377 (2010) [hereinafter Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive 
Procedure]; Stephen N. Subrin, Thoughts on Misjudging Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 513 
(2007); Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound 
Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79 (1997); Stephen 
N. Subrin & John Sutton, Welfare Class Actions in Federal Court: A Procedural Analysis, 8 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 21 (1973). 
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fessor Subrin’s more than thirty-year heroic effort to end the “one size fits all” 
nature of the Rules,20 have failed to move the Committee in that direction. As a 
result, we now find ourselves closer than ever to the harsh reality: “Trials as we 
have known them . . . are not coming back.”21 Indeed, an Illinois state court 
judge recently wrote about another judge teaching trial advocacy who proposed 
to students, akin to Johnny Carson’s “Carnac the Magnificent” skit, where the 
answer is given first: Answer: “A Tyrannosaurus rex and a jury trial.” Ques-
tion: “Name two scary things today’s lawyers will probably never encounter.”22 
Sadly, one will always be able to see a Tyrannosaurus in a museum, but what 
about a trial by jury? I recently mourned the death of the American trial lawyer 
in a mock obituary,23 and bemoaned the increase in motions to dismiss and 
summary judgment (paper trials) to deny plaintiffs their day in court, especially 
in employment discrimination and civil rights litigation.24 Others, like U.S. Dis-
trict Judge Xavier Rodriguez take a middling position: “Jury trials as we knew 
them are on the decline. That may or may not be problematic . . . .”25 Professors 
Subrin and Burbank, in an eye-popping introduction to a recent article, cleverly 
observed the impact of declining civil jury trials on major law firms: 
It struck us as odd. At some time, probably in the middle 1970s or early 
1980s, we heard that major law firms were conducting mock trials so that their 
young lawyers could experience what it was like to be in a courtroom. This was 
something new. Historically, young lawyers witnessed cases in real courts, ar-
gued motions before judges, and watched partners and older associates try cases. 
Young lawyers soon tried simple cases before judges and later with juries. This 
is how they learned to be trial lawyers and not just litigators.26 
In the span of less than eighty years, our federal civil justice system has 
morphed from trial by ambush with no formal discovery, but significant num-
bers of civil jury trials, to the passage of the Rules and the hot mess in which 
                                                        
20  Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 19, at 377. 
21  D. Brock Hornby, The Business of the U.S. District Courts, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 453, 468 
(2007). 
22  Ron Spears, Dinosaurs and Jury Trials: Adaptation or Extinction?, 101 ILL. B.J. 264, 264 
(2013). 
23  Mark W. Bennett, Obituary: The American Trial Lawyer, Born 1641–Died 20??, 
LITIGATION, Spring 2013, at 5, 5. The article starts: 
The American trial lawyer (ATL), who, in innumerable ways, enhanced the lives of so 
many Americans and made the United States a fairer, healthier, safer, more egalitarian, and just 
nation, passed away recently. Although a precise age is uncertain, ATL is believed to have been 
at least 371 years old at the time of death. 
Id. 
24  Bennett, supra note 2, at 686. 
25  Xavier Rodriguez, The Decline of Civil Jury Trials: A Positive Development, Myth, or the 
End of Justice as We Now Know It?, 45 ST. MARY’S L.J. 333, 365 (2014). 
26  Burbank & Subrin, Litigation and Democracy, supra note 19, at 399. Indeed, in a No-
vember 2014 civil jury trial, a large Iowa law firm brought four associates four hundred 
miles round-trip to observe a day of jury trial featuring three of the firm’s trial lawyers. 
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we now find ourselves.27 We now have trial by avalanche, but that is a misno-
mer too, because we so rarely have civil jury trials in federal court. What we 
really have is an un-Godly expensive and protracted “litigation” by avalanche 
industry. This is true for small, mid-size, and large firms representing both 
plaintiffs and defendants. This includes deep sea fishing discovery expeditions, 
virtually unlimited obstructionist discovery tactics, a parallel cottage industry 
of discovery companies, e-discovery consultants, armies of contract lawyers, 
and highly-compensated associates and junior partners of litigation firms who 
almost exclusively replace real trial lawyers in the discovery process. 
In the context of Professor Subrin’s career and his own scholarship, when 
the Rules were passed “about [18] percent of civil cases terminated in Federal 
Court were resolved by trial.”28 When Professor Subrin “started practicing law 
in 1963, the figure was down to about [12] percent and in 2002 it was below [2] 
percent.”29 Estimating Professor Subrin’s approximate date of birth to be 1938, 
in that year about 20 percent of federal civil cases were resolved by trial.30 By 
2009, the “percentage of jury trials in federal civil cases was down to just under 
1 [percent], and the percentage of bench trials was even lower.”31 Between Pro-
fessor Subrin’s birth and 2009, “there was a decline in the percentage of civil 
cases going to trial of over 90 [percent] and the pace of the decline was accel-
erating toward the end of that period, until very recently, when there was al-
most literally, no further decline possible.”32 As one of the gurus of the vanish-
ing civil trial has recently observed: “The no news story is that the trend lines 
regarding trials are unchanged. The big news story is that the civil trial is ap-
proaching extinction.”33 
After discussing whether jury trials are worth saving, this essay addresses 
the big, but gloomy picture of declining civil jury trials and the rise of the ob-
structionist “litigation industry.” It then explains why the 2015 proposed 
amendments to the Rules are merely further “nibbling around the edges” with 
not only little prospect of reform but likely leading to substantial, unintended 
consequences. The penultimate section explores my proposed changes, as 
Grand Poobah, for fundamental reform of the Rules that would reduce cost and 
delay and provide our best hope for the revival of civil jury trials. 
                                                        
27  “Hot mess” has many definitions, including: “A state of disarray so chaotic that it’s dizzy-
ing to look at. A mess that is beyond the normal range of disarray.” Hot Mess,  
URB. DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=hot%20mess (last vis-
ited May 4, 2015). 
28  Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 19, at 393. 
29  Id. 
30  Robert P. Burns, What Will We Lose If the Trial Vanishes? 3 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law, 
Faculty Working Paper No. 5, 2011), available at http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern 
.edu/facultyworkingpapers/5/. 
31  Id. at 4. 
32  Id. 
33  Marc Galanter & Angela Frozena, ‘A Grin Without a Cat’: Civil Trials in the Federal 
Courts 1 (MAY 1, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/3289/. 
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I. ARE JURY TRIALS WORTH SAVING? 
Depends on who you ask. No doubt the colonists valued the right to trial by 
jury.34 In response to the Stamp Act of 1765, delegates met in New York from 
nine of the thirteen colonies in the Stamp Act Congress, adopting a Declaration 
of Rights and Grievances, including the provision “[t]hat Tryal [sic] by jury is 
the inherent and invaluable Right of every British Subject, in these Colonies.”35 
In the Declaration of Independence, the colonists stated as a reason for separa-
tion: “For depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury.”36 As 
Professor Lerner points out, early jurists like Judge Thomas Waites in 1794 in 
South Carolina, saw the right to trial by jury as a means to “help prevent judi-
cial bias in favor of rich and influential private persons,” and to provide “ ‘a 
better chance, generally, that the poor [would] receive an equal measure of jus-
tice with the rich.’ ”37 
In most discussions of the value of trial by jury, authors inevitably cite 
Democracy in America by Alexis de Tocqueville.38 Yet, U.S. District Judge 
Rodriguez noted that, while de Tocqueville admired the jury system for its edu-
cational value for jurors, he was not as sure about its value for the litigants.39 
                                                        
34  Before becoming Chief Justice, then-Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote: 
The founders of our Nation considered the right of trial by jury in civil cases an important bul-
wark against tyranny and corruption, a safeguard too precious to be left to the whim of the sov-
ereign, or, it might be added, to that of the judiciary. Those who passionately advocated the right 
to a civil jury trial did not do so because they considered the jury a familiar procedural device 
that should be continued; the concerns for the institution of jury trial that led to the passages of 
the Declaration of Independence and to the Seventh Amendment were not animated by a belief 
that use of juries would lead to more efficient judicial administration. Trial by a jury of laymen 
rather than by the sovereign’s judges was important to the founders because juries represent the 
layman’s common sense, the “passional elements in our nature,” and thus keep the administra-
tion of law in accord with the wishes and feelings of the community. Those who favored juries 
believed that a jury would reach a result that a judge either could not or would not reach. 
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343–44 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (ci-
tation and footnotes omitted). 
35  Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress (1765), quoted in Lerner, supra note 16, at 818. 
36  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776). 
37  Lerner, supra note 16, at 832–33 (alteration in original) (quoting Zylstra v. Corp. of 
Charleston, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382, 396 (S.C. 1794) (Waites, J.)). 
38  See, e.g., three of my federal judicial colleague authors: Rodriguez, supra note 25, at 336 
(“[A] number of commentators have expressed alarm that the political and socializing role of 
the jury will be lost. Many of these commentators will reference Democracy in America by 
Alexis de Tocqueville in support of their argument that the decline of jury trials must be re-
versed. There is no doubt de Tocqueville admired the role of juries. However, as with the 
writings of all great thinkers, everyone can find a sentence in de Tocqueville’s works to sup-
port his or her theory.” (footnotes omitted)); B. Lynn Winmill, To My Russian Colleagues, 
ADVOCATE, Dec. 2002, at 8, 10 (“In de Tocqueville’s view, the American jury system played 
a critical role in creating public respect and support for the judiciary and the rule of law.”); 
William G. Young, An Open Letter to U.S. District Judges, FED. LAW., July 2003, at 30, 31 
(“As Alexis de Tocqueville so elegantly put it, ‘[t]he jury system . . . [is] as direct and as ex-
treme a consequence of the sovereignty of the people as universal suffrage.’ ” (alterations in 
original)). 
39  Rodriguez, supra note 25, at 336–37. 
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What has always struck me as odd is that some federal trial court judges 
see jury trial as a failure! Professor Judith Resnik observed more than a decade 
ago: 
In the fall of 1994, the Los Angeles Federal Bar Association held a meeting 
for some hundred lawyers to discuss then-recent changes to the rules that govern 
the processes of litigation in the federal court system. At that time, of one hun-
dred civil cases commenced in federal court, about eight started trial; the re-
maining ninety-two ended in other ways. Introducing the program, a federal dis-
trict judge stated that he regarded the eight percent trial rate as evidence of 
“lawyers’ failure.” 
That got my attention: a person whose title was “trial judge” equated going 
to trial with failure. His relevance rests on the fact that he is not alone. Found in 
reported decisions is the phrase “a bad settlement is almost always better than a 
good trial.” Found in rules and policy statements of the federal judiciary are in-
creasing obligations of judges to press parties toward settlement. For example, a 
local rule in the federal trial courts of Massachusetts requires a judge to raise the 
topic of settlement at every conference held with attorneys. Moreover, this grow-
ing law of settlement is not simply hortatory. Court rules and statutes require lit-
igants and their lawyers to engage in a variety of settlement processes; penalties 
flow from failure to comply.40 
Professors Burbank and Subrin also note a federal trial court judge stating 
as early as 1971 that, “[M]y goal is to settle all my cases. . . . Most of the time 
when I try a case I consider that I have somehow failed the lawyers and the liti-
gants.”41 Shockingly, this was stated by a federal trial court judge at a training 
seminar for new federal trial court judges sponsored by the Federal Judicial 
Center.42 I have witnessed this, too: 
I was stunned last year while speaking at a CLE program on an antitrust litiga-
tion panel when a federal judicial colleague and friend boldly declared that a 
“jury trial was a failure of the system.” Before calling 911, I did manage to blurt 
out my strong disagreement! With all due respect, this colleague suffers from a 
lethal dose of “managerial judging Kool-Aid.” But, in his defense, he came from 
a large firm “litigation” practice, not a true trial practice. He is a terrific judge, 
but simply doesn’t share my love, respect, and passion for trial by jury. I have, 
on occasion, heard similar expressions at judges-only conferences and in private 
conversations with a few judges, but to hear a colleague publicly declare that a 
jury trial was a failure of the system was absolutely flabbergasting.43 
Professors Burbank and Subrin recently articulated many of the reasons 
why restoring a realistic prospect of civil jury trials furthers our nation’s goals 
of democracy.44 First, “[a]s Tocqueville observed in describing the newly cre-
                                                        
40  Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article 
III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 925–26 (2000) (footnotes omitted). 
41  Burbank & Subrin, Litigation and Democracy, supra note 19, at 399 (alterations in origi-
nal). 
42  Id. at 399 n.2. 
43  Bennett, supra note 2, at 707 (footnote omitted). 
44  Burbank & Subrin, Litigation and Democracy, supra note 19, at 401–03. 
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ated American state, participating as jurors and witnessing trials were critical 
means of educating Americans about the law and giving them a stake in their 
courts and country.”45 My experience wholeheartedly confirms this. For over 
two decades, I have “debriefed” every jury after their verdict.46 I am pleased to 
report that jurors nearly uniformly express admiration about the process and 
become enthusiastic ambassadors for trial by jury. Professors Burbank and 
Subrin also note that the right to be heard in a public trial is at the “core of due 
process” and “has been integral to democratic thought and institutions at least 
since the English Magna Carta in the thirteenth century.”47 They also posit that 
civil jury trials are essential to “ensure informed settlement”;48 are necessary to 
“counterbalance[] the authority of judges”;49 and that the “founders believed 
that twelve heads are better than one in finding facts.”50 “Finally, unlike confi-
dential settlements, decisions after trial have the potential to affect the behavior 
of others . . . .”51 I also add that trials and appeals play an instrumental role in 
shaping the development of the common, statutory, and constitutional law. 
In her penetrating article summarizing scholarship on the current state of 
summary judgment, Professor Brooke D. Coleman observes that the debate 
comes down to not so much the fairness or the efficiency of summary judg-
ment, “but really just about one critical issue—the jury trial. Regardless of what 
the data might tell us, the bottom line is that one either has great faith in the 
value of the jury trial or one does not.”52 Based on my nearly forty years in the 
profession, my unshakeable faith in the jury trial has never been stronger. 
                                                        
45  Id. at 402. 
46  I have described this process as follows: 
After reading a verdict in open court, I debrief every juror in the jury room and answer 
their questions. As they are leaving, I give them a juror questionnaire, with a self-addressed 
stamped envelope, and ask them to fill it out at their convenience and mail it back to my cham-
bers. I discuss this questionnaire with potential jurors in jury selection as a means of empower-
ing them. I let them know that the lawyers and I are vitally interested in their feedback. I tell 
them that our court has made many changes in the way we do our business based on juror feed-
back over the years. When the questionnaires are returned, my judicial assistant shares the in-
formation with the attorneys for their review. 
Mark W. Bennett, Eight Traits of Great Trial Lawyers: A Federal Judge’s View on How to 
Shed the Moniker “I Am a Litigator”, 33 REV. LITIG. 1, 2 n.4 (2013). 
47  Burbank & Subrin, Litigation and Democracy, supra note 19, at 401. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. at 402. 
50  Id. 
51  Id. 
52  Brooke D. Coleman, Summary Judgment: What We Think We Know Versus What We 
Ought to Know, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 705, 725 (2012). 
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II. THE GLOOMY BIG PICTURE 
A. Overview 
Over a quarter of a century ago, Professor Stephen N. Subrin noted “[w]e 
are good at using equity process and thought to create new legal rights. We 
have, however, largely failed at . . . providing methods for their efficient vindi-
cation.”53 Professor Subrin prophetically observed: “The momentum toward 
case management, settlement, and alternative dispute resolution represents, for 
the most part, a continued failure to use predefined procedures in a manner that 
will try, however imperfectly, to deliver predefined law and rights.”54 
In a succinct and insightful article, my mentor, U.S. District Judge D. 
Brock Hornby warned: “Law professors and judges should stop bemoaning dis-
appearing trials. Trials have gone the way of landline telephones—useful back-
ups, not the instruments primarily relied upon, if ever they were.”55 For nearly a 
quarter-century, I have found it unwise to ignore Judge Hornby’s advice. My 
passion for civil jury trials and my desire to see them flourish once again per-
haps clouds this exception. The intent of this essay is to establish a framework 
to overcome Judge Hornby’s sage observation that users of the federal courts’ 
civil justice system no longer “expect or even want a trial.”56 Unless we can 
change the current “litigation industry” paradigm, civil jury trials will surely go 
from vanishing to extinction—a relic that confounded a solution. As Professors 
Burbank and Subrin have recently and elegantly written: “If trials became an 
economically realistic option in substantially more cases, lawyers could no 
longer hide behind settlement, and law schools would once again know that 
they were training students for the world as it is rather than as it was.”57 
Let me define the world of federal civil justice: “The Litigation Industry!” 
At bottom, it involves too many pleadings; far too much unnecessary discovery 
that will never be used, not even in the wildest imagination of a real trial lawyer 
who actually anticipates going to trial; too many retained experts for too much 
money; too much motion practice; too much legal research on too many frivo-
lous issues largely to keep associates busy and bill out their time; too many in-
tra-firm lawyer conferences and too much duplication of effort; too many re-
sources thrown into summary judgment paper trials, all performed by far too 
many lawyers per side.58 
                                                        
53  Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 19, at 1001. 
54  Id. at 1001–02. 
55  Hornby, supra note 21, at 467–68. 
56  Id. at 461. 
57  Burbank & Subrin, Litigation and Democracy, supra note 19, at 414. 
58  I recently read an article in a widely read legal journal mourning the passing of a manag-
ing partner at a major East Coast law firm. It noted that he was universally considered a 
“hard-nosed litigator” and used that philosophy to grow the firm rapidly. I wondered what 
that meant. Did he notice depositions on short notice without a courtesy phone call to oppos-
ing counsel to find suitable dates for depositions? Did the deposition notices include grossly 
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B. Bennett’s Multiphasic Litigator Inventory® 
The old saw “litigators are always prepared but never ready for trial, while 
trial lawyers are never prepared but always ready for trial” is funny and, in my 
experience, mostly true, but a better “test” for determining the difference be-
tween a litigator and a trial lawyer is needed. Because there is no universally 
accepted definition of a “litigator” in legal or scientific literature, I have devel-
oped the ten-factor Bennett Multiphasic Litigator Inventory® to conclusively 
distinguish between a “litigator” and a real trial lawyer. A “yes” answer score 
of three or more strongly indicates a “litigator”; a score of five or more is pre-
sumptive for being a “litigator”; and a score of six or higher is conclusive. The 
ten-factor test is: 
1. Does the lawyer travel in packs?59 
2. Does the lawyer suffer from “boiler plate objection to discovery” ad-
diction?60 
3. Does the lawyer move for at least two continuances of the firm trial 
date?61 
4. Does the lawyer always fail to suggest and argue strenuously against 
the most reasonable solution for a problem?62 
                                                                                                                                
overbroad subpoenas for documents? Did he cuss often at depositions, interpose frivolous 
objections, and frequently improperly instruct the witness not to answer, object for the pur-
poses of improperly coaching the witness by suggesting the answer he wanted in the objec-
tion? Did he file boilerplate objections to every one of the other sides’ interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents with the intent to never provide clearly discoverable 
information? Did he bury the other side with needless and overbroad interrogatories and re-
quests for production of documents? Was he quick to file discovery motions rather than 
making serious attempts to work out differences? Did he almost always resist the opposing 
sides’ reasonable requests for extra time to answer discovery? Did he relish in filing needless 
motions to dismiss? Did he take seriously his Rule 26 duties of initial disclosure or jack op-
posing counsel around by giving only partial responses? Did he file multiple and mostly non-
meritorious motions for summary judgment? If his cases actually got to the final pretrial con-
ference stage, did he object to over 90 percent of the other sides’ witnesses and object to ex-
hibits on numerous and largely frivolous grounds? Did he file thirty-eight motions in limine, 
most of which were so vague the trial judge could not tell what he wanted excluded because 
he failed to attach any of the items he raised in the motions and assumed the trial judge must 
live in the discovery file? I certainly have witnessed up close and personal out-of-state law 
firms do all this and much, much more in the name of “hard-nosed litigation.” I have seldom 
had a real trial lawyer do any of this! (The name of the article and, thus, the “hard-nosed liti-
gator” have been deleted out of respect for his passing.) 
59  Litigators cannot sign a pleading by themselves, it takes at least two litigators to sit at all 
depositions, three or more to attend a phone conference with the judge, and four or more to 
attend a court hearing. Bennett Multiphasic Litigator Inventory®, Question 1 (2015 edition). 
60  Objections never are made on a single, individualized, specific, and occasionally correct 
ground. Bennett Multiphasic Litigator Inventory®, Question 2 (2015 edition). 
61  Trial lawyers accommodate firm trial dates because they like trying cases. Litigators 
avoid them at all costs including sometimes wacky reasons for the continuance. Be especial-
ly aware of last minute claims of conflicting trial dates. Bennett Multiphasic Litigator Inven-
tory®, Question 3 (2015 edition). 
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5. Does the lawyer file repetitive motions to dismiss and for summary 
judgment with mostly frivolous arguments?63 
6. Does the lawyer habitually file motions to file over-length briefs even 
for the simplest of matters?64 
7. Does the lawyer insist on in-person hearings even after the judge has 
suggested doing it by telephone?65 
8. Does the lawyer always claim it is the other lawyer’s fault and refuse 
to ever take responsibility for creating the problem?66 
9. Does the lawyer file record-setting numbers of motions in limine that 
are totally out of proportion to the case?67 
10. Does the lawyer call the magistrate judge during a deposition to have 
the judge decide the length of the lunch break?68 
Civil litigation in federal court is simply too expensive to accommodate 
many trials. This is actually nothing new. In 1987, Professor Subrin wrote 
about concerns over excessive costs and delays and discovery abuses raised at 
the 1976 Pound Conference.69 The macro problem is that each of the actors in 
the system has lost their way. It is not that complicated. Because of the vanish-
ing civil jury trial (and for that matter, real trial court judges rather than case 
managers), “litigators” no longer know how to try an effective case, if they ever 
did. In my experience, many “litigation” partners in litigation firms have not 
                                                                                                                                
62  Litigators by their very nature are often unreasonable. A helping test to determine this is 
to see if the lawyer has an allergy to reasonableness, which can be performed by a skin 
PRICK test. Bennett Multiphasic Litigator Inventory®, Question 4 (2015 edition). 
63  The litigator never takes “no” for an answer and repeatedly re-raises non-meritorious ar-
guments at every opportunity that have already been rejected by the trial court judge. Ben-
nett Multiphasic Litigator Inventory®, Question 5 (2015 edition). 
64  This is often the result of law firm leveraging with legions of the best and the brightest 
associates to keep busy billing at substantial hourly rates. Bennett Multiphasic Litigator In-
ventory®, Question 6 (2015 edition). 
65  Apparently, because litigators hate to actually go to trial, these in-person appearances 
generate great water cooler embellished stories to enthrall associates and intimidate oppo-
nents. Bennett Multiphasic Litigator Inventory®, Question 7 (2015 edition). 
66  The litigator’s credo includes never, ever taking any personal responsibility for the prob-
lems created in litigation. Bennett Multiphasic Litigator Inventory®, Question 8 (2015 edi-
tion). 
67  Rather than filing a single motion in limine with ten parts, the litigator files ten separate 
motions with fifty parts. Often the litigator files dozens of motions in limine marked by 
make-work to preclude things like settlement negotiations, insurance, and the fact the litiga-
tor has been sanctioned in this and other cases—items the other side has no intention or in-
terest in offering and that are clearly inadmissible, that is, if the litigator actually knew or 
consulted the Federal Rules of Evidence. Bennett Multiphasic Litigator Inventory®, Ques-
tion 9 (2015 edition). 
68  This is the acid test and a “yes” answer to this question, regardless of the answers to the 
first nine questions, conclusively establish the lawyer is a litigator and beyond redemption. 
Bennett Multiphasic Litigator Inventory®, Question 10 (2015 edition). Order, Hulina v. Ma-
rengo Rescue Squad, No. 12-CV-10424 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 6, 2014), No. 80 (stating that litiga-
tors called U.S. Magistrate Judge Iain D. Johnston because they could not agree on the 
length of a lunch break during a deposition, in which the judge had previously had to deter-
mine the place for the deposition because the litigators were unable to agree). 
69  Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 19, at 911, 974. 
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tried a jury trial in decades, if ever. What makes anyone think their next case 
will be their first? The lack of experience and fear of going to trial are major 
impediments to more federal trials. The Gerry Spence type real trial lawyers 
have been replaced with water cooler Clarence Darrows, tough-talking “litiga-
tors” who talk a great game but in the end always settle.70 “Litigators” don’t try 
lawsuits, they “litigate” them ad nauseam with enormous expense and delay for 
their clients. No wonder it’s too expensive to actually proceed to trial. Two 
federal practitioners recently described the vicious cycle of escalating federal 
discovery this way: 
In short, the actual operation of the Rules and the incentives they create for 
parties and their attorneys almost automatically turn what should be a two-step 
process of discovery requests followed by responses into an iterative, multi-step 
ordeal, in which responses are followed by conferences, then amended respons-
es, then further conferences, and so on. All of this haggling and negotiation over 
what should largely be well-settled matters not only drives up costs, it may even 
encourage propounding parties to serve broader discovery requests than they 
otherwise would in order to leave themselves room to bargain. Such unneces-
sarily broad requests encourage similarly broad objections, in turn leading to 
further bargaining and significantly driving up costs.71 
It is a daunting challenge to restructure the Rules to substantially reduce lit-
igation costs, eliminate needless discovery and litigation obstructionism, and 
hopefully reinvigorate trial by jury. The latest efforts of the Committee, while 
no doubt the product of extraordinary hard work and noble intentions, with re-
spect, will not likely accomplish any of these goals. 
III. THE 2015 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES:  
MORE NIBBLING AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
The Committee has proposed a new round of amendments to the Rules that 
may go into effect in 2015.72 The Committee “has proposed a package of 
amendments designed to streamline pretrial discovery, promote hands on litiga-
tion management by the courts and encourage cooperation among the parties 
and the courts in the conduct of the pretrial phase of a case.”73 These proposed 
amendments “represent the first comprehensive change in discovery practice 
                                                        
70  One of the keys to my chambers’ civil case management is stacking multiple civil jury 
cases on the same start date knowing that counsel in these cases will always settle. It has 
never failed. Once I am able identify a litigator as a “serial, recidivist settler” they have nev-
er gone to trial. 
71  Daniel C. Girard & Todd I. Espinosa, Limiting Evasive Discovery: A Proposal for Three 
Cost-Saving Amendments to the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 473, 477 (2010). 
72  PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 4; Edward D. Cavanagh, 
The 2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Path to Meaningful 
Containment of Discovery Costs in Antitrust Litigation?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2014, art. 
4, at 1. 
73  Cavanagh, supra note 72. 
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since the Supreme Court’s decisions” in Twombly and Iqbal.74 The way Profes-
sor Edward Cavanagh describes these amendments—“streamlining pretrial dis-
covery,” “hands on litigation management,” and “encourage cooperation 
among the parties and the courts”—they sound more American than the flag 
and apple pie. While the implications of these proposed amendments for the 
federal civil justice system is beyond the scope of this article, I have grave res-
ervations that, if adopted, they will improve anything. In fact, I predict these 
amendments, proposed by the large-law-firm-influenced Committee,75 will sig-
                                                        
74  Id.; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662 (2009). 
75  The vast majority of the members of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules have strong 
ties to large rather than small law firms. Those ties are as follows: 
x Judge David G. Campbell worked at Osborn Maledon, a large Phoenix law firm. David G. 
Campbell, DUKE LAW, https://law.duke.edu/judicialstudies/conferences/april2013/campbell/ 
(last visited May 4, 2015); 
x John M. Barkett is a partner at Shook, Hardy & Bacon, a large international law  
firm. Attorneys: John M. Barkett, SHOOK, HARDY & BACON, 
http://www.shb.com/attorney_detail.aspx?id=276 (last visited May 4, 2015); Integrated Legal 
Services, SHOOK, HARDY & BACON, http://www.shb.com/about/integrated-legal-services (last 
visited May 4, 2015); 
x Elizabeth Cabraser is a partner at Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, “a sixty-plus  
attorney law firm with offices in San Francisco, New York and Nashville.”  
Attorneys: Elizabeth J. Cabraser, LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, 
http://www.lieffcabraser.com/Attorneys/Elizabeth-J-Cabraser.shtml (last visited May 4, 2015); 
About Us, LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, http://www.lieffcabraser.com 
/About-Us/ (last visited May 4, 2015); 
x Stuart F. Delery was a partner at Wilmer Hale, a larger international law firm. Press Release, 
Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Welcomes the Confirmation of Stuart F. Del-
ery as Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division (Aug. 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-eric-holder-welcomes-confirmation-stuart-f-de 
lery-assistant-attorney-general (last visited May 4, 2015); Offices, WILMERHALE, 
http://www.wilmerhale.com/offices/offices/ (last visited May 4, 2015) (“WilmerHale is 1,000 
lawyers strong, with 14 offices in the United States, Europe and Asia.”); 
x Judge Paul S. Diamond was a partner at Dilworth, Paxson, Kalish & Kauffman and Obermay-
er Rebmann Maxwell & Hippel, which are large East Coast law firms. Judicial Nominations, 
WHITE HOUSE, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/judicialnominees 
/diamond.html (last visited May 4, 2015); About Dilworth, DILWORTH PAXSON, 
http://www.dilworthlaw.com/AboutDilworth (last visited May 4, 2015); Offices, OBERMAYER 
REBMANN MAXWELL & HIPPEL, http://www.obermayer.com/our-firm/offices/ (last visited 
May 4, 2015); 
x Parker C. Folse is a partner at Susman Godfrey, a large national law firm. Attorneys, SUSMAN 
GODFREY, http://www.susmangodfrey.com/Attorneys/Parker-C-Folse/#Pane1 (last visited 
May 4, 2015); Contact Us, SUSMAN GODFREY, http://www.susmangodfrey.com/Contact-Us/ 
(last visited May 4, 2015); 
x Peter D. Keisler is a partner at Sidley Austin, a large international law firm. People, SIDLEY 
AUSTIN, http://www.sidley.com/en/people/peter-keisler (last visited May 4, 2015); Press Re-
lease, Sidley Austin, For the Fifth Consecutive Year Sidley Austin LLP Is Recognized With 
the Most First-Tier National Rankings in the 2015 U.S. News—Best Lawyers “Best  
Law Firms” Survey (Nov. 3, 2014), available at http://www.sidley.com/news 
/for-the-fifth-consecutive-year-sidley-austin-llp-is-recognized-with-the-most-first-tier-nation 
al-rankings-in-the-2015-us-news--best-lawyers-best-law-firms-survey-11-03-2014 (“With 
more than 1,800 lawyers in 18 offices worldwide, Sidley has built a reputation as a premier 
legal adviser for global businesses and financial institutions.”); 
x Professor Robert Klonoff worked for Jones Day, a large international law firm. Law Faculty, 
LEWIS & CLARK LAW SCH., http://law.lclark.edu/live/profiles/310-robert-klonoff (last visited 
May 4, 2015); 
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nificantly increase both the costs and delay of federal civil litigation. One can-
not help but wonder how the Rules would be different if, over the years, the 
Committee had instead been dominated by trial lawyers who do both plaintiff 
and defense work that hail from cities like Ft. Dodge, Iowa; Muncie, Indiana; 
Rapid City, South Dakota; and Lincoln, Nebraska. Indeed, are those skeptical 
of this most recent round of proposed amendments suspicious that “BigLaw” is 
salivating at the prospect of their adoption? 
The alleged “streamlining” of “pretrial discovery” mostly recycles notions 
of discovery “proportionality”76 that have been around for over thirty years in 
the Rules and currently reside in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii), which “was adopted as 
part of the Federal Rules in 1983.”77 The proposed nibbling moves the propor-
tionality standard up to Rule 26(b)(1) and requires that discovery relevant to a 
claim or defense be “proportional to the needs of the case.”78 Of course, pro-
                                                                                                                                
x Judge John G. Koeltl was a partner at Debevoise & Plimpton, a large international law firm. 
Hon. John G. Koeltl, PRACTISING L. INST., http://www.pli.edu/Content/Faculty 
/John_G_Koeltl/_/N-1z13ed6Z4o?ID=PE188088 (last visited May 4, 2015); About Us, 
DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON, http://www.debevoise.com/aboutus/overview (last visited Mar. 29, 
2015) (stating that Debevoise has approximately 650 lawyers throughout its eight offices 
worldwide); 
x Judge Scott M. Matheson, Jr. worked for Williams & Connolly, a large law firm in  
Washington D.C. Judge Scott M. Matheson, Jr., TENTH CIRCUIT CT. APPEALS, 
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/judges/judge-scott-m-matheson-jr (last visited May 4, 2015); 
Firm Overview, WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY, http://www.wc.com/about.html (last visited May 4, 
2015) (noting that Williams & Connolly has approximately 275 lawyers); 
x Judge Michael W. Mosman worked for Miller Nash, a large Northwest law firm. Gordon 
Smith, Public Statements at the Nomination of Michael W. Mosman to be United States  
District Judge (Sept. 25, 2003), available at http://votesmart.org/public-statement 
/21839/nomination-of-michael-w-mosman-to-be-united-states-district-judge; Firm History, 
MILLER NASH, http://www.millernash.com/timeline/ (last visited May 4, 2015) (“Today, the 
firm has about 160 attorneys practicing in Portland and Bend, Oregon; Seattle and Vancouver, 
Washington; and Long Beach, California.”); 
x Justice David E. Nahmias worked for Hogan & Hartson (now Hogan Lovells), a  
large international law firm. Justice David E. Nahmias, SUP. CT. GA., 
http://www.gasupreme.us/biographies/nahmias.php (last visited May 4, 2015); Amanda Beck-
er, Hogan Lovells Merger Makes Firm One of Largest in U.S., WASH. POST (May 3, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/30/AR2010043002575.html; 
x Judge Gene E.K. Pratter was a partner at Duane Morris, a large international law firm. Alumni 
Profiles, DUANE MORRIS, http://www.duanemorris.com/site/alumni_profiles_pratter.html  
(last visited May 4, 2015); About Duane Morris, DUANE MORRIS, 
http://www.duanemorris.com/site/about.html (last visited May 4, 2015) (“Duane Morris LLP 
[is] a law firm with more than 700 attorneys in offices across the United States and interna-
tionally . . . .”); and 
x Judge Diane P. Wood worked at Covington & Burling, a large international law  
firm. The Faculty, U. CHI. L. SCH., http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/wood-d  
(last visited May 4, 2015); Firm History, COVINGTON & BURLING, 
http://www.cov.com/about_the_firm/firm_history/ (last visited May 4, 2015)  
(“Today, the firm numbers more than 850 lawyers in ten offices [worldwide].”); 
see also Membership of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and Advisory 
Rules Committees, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules 
/committee-roster.pdf (last visited May 4, 2015) (listing the committee’s current members). 
76  See PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 4, at 264–69. 
77  Cavanagh, supra note 72, at 5. 
78  Id.; see also PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 4, at 289. 
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portionality is in the eye of the responder to a discovery request. Thus, the 
amendment’s renewed, but restated, standard simply provides a newly empha-
sized target for additional discovery disputes arguing lack of proportionality on 
every discovery request. It appears that every litigator has a new weapon to op-
pose or limit discovery responses by sua sponte deciding lack of proportionali-
ty. This virtually guarantees that “proportionality” will become the new ob-
structionist mantra of the litigation industry. 
Another proposed 2015 amendment strikes me as an Alice in Wonderland79 
approach to the litigation industry. While discovery is “a process meant to be 
collegial[,] [a]ttorneys will unleash a barrage of discovery requests, or a trickle 
of incomplete responses, to batter the opposing side into settlement or bleed it 
into surrender.”80 The Committee seeks to change the obstructionist culture of 
the litigation industry by amending Rule 1 to provide that the Rules “should be 
construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure 
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceed-
ing.”81 To quote tennis legend John McEnroe’s famous exhortation on a bad 
line call at Wimbledon in 1984: “YOU CANNOT BE SERIOUS!”82 This 
amendment is worthless. If anyone thinks it could have an iota of impact on the 
current culture of obstructionism, there awaits you a bridge in Brooklyn to pur-
chase. This is exactly the type of Committee nibbling that makes true reform 
unlikely. 
On a slightly more positive note, there are a few of the proposed 2015 
amendments attempting to impose new presumptive limitations on discovery 
that make some sense. However, by engrafting huge exceptions to these pre-
sumptive limitations, the Committee continues to repeat the mistakes of the 
past. The new proposed presumptive limitations on depositions and their length 
include no more than five depositions being taken by a party for no more than 
six hours per deposition.83 For the first time, there are limits on requests for 
admissions (twenty-five, including subparts);84 and reductions to the number of 
                                                        
79  LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND (1865), available at 
http://etc.usf.edu/lit2go/1/alices-adventures-in-wonderland/ (discussing the work that is fre-
quently shortened to Alice in Wonderland as a classic novel by Rev. Charles Lutwidge 
Dodgson (pen name Lewis Carroll) creating a girl named Alice who follows the White Rab-
bit down a hole into a fantasy world of strange anthropomorphic creatures). 
80  Wilson, supra note 8, at 177. 
81  PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 4, at 281 (listing new lan-
guage in proposed Rule 1 shown by emphasis). 
82  At Wimbledon in 2011, it was observed that is has been “30 years since John McEnroe 
electrified a first round match against Tom Gullikson with the immortal words, hurled at 
Edward James, the umpire: ‘You can’t be serious, man. YOU CANNOT BE SERIOUS! 
That ball was on the line! Chalk flew up! It was clearly in! You guys are the absolute  
pits of the world.’ ” Adam Lusher, Thirty Years Ago? You Cannot be Serious, TELEGRAPH  
(June 19, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/8584101 
/Thirty-years-ago-You-cannot-be-serious.html. 
83  PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 4, at 300–01. 
84  Id. at 310–11. 
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interrogatories from twenty-five to fifteen (including subparts).85 Regrettably, 
all of these presumptive limitations may be waived by stipulations of the parties 
or court order.86 
I do not believe these reforms go nearly far enough. Of course, any value 
that might have come from these presumptive limitations in terms of reducing 
cost and delay can be easily stipulated away. Worse, when that does not hap-
pen, these proposed reforms will encourage litigators to engage in more bicker-
ing obstructionist conduct and create a new major round of extended discovery 
motion practice to expand these presumptive limitations. In sum, the 2015 pro-
posed amendments are more reforms, yet little progress, creating likely unin-
tended consequences that will exaggerate the continuing problems of excessive 
cost and delay. 
IV. REFORMS AND TACKLING THE EIGHT HUNDRED POUND GORILLA 
A. Bitter Poison Pills for Litigators 
The suggested cures that follow will be a bitter poison pill for “litigators,” 
who are posers for real “trial lawyers.” Over a decade ago I wrote: 
[I]t seems to this court that while there appears to be no shortage of “litiga-
tors”—indeed they seem to be propagating throughout the profession—true fed-
eral civil “trial lawyers,” those willing to delve into the crucible of federal civil 
jury trials on a regular basis, are becoming an endangered species. Moreover, 
there is probably no greater shell game in the law than “litigators” attempting to 
pass themselves off as real “trial lawyers.” Stories of “litigation partners” at 
mid- and large-size firms with virtually no or extremely limited real federal civil 
jury trial experience are legion. In sum, while there are many terrific litigators, 
there are far fewer terrific federal trial lawyers who ply their craft on a regular 
basis before federal civil juries.87 
The authors of a recent law review article on the lack of jury trial experi-
ence by the current crop of litigators advance an interesting argument that the 
failure to disclose this lack of jury trial experience to prospective clients is an 
ethical violation.88 If their view comes to pass as a majority view, this might do 
more to reduce cost and delay than all the reforms to the Rules. Hiring real trial 
lawyers rather than a “litigation industry” approach would surely dramatically 
reduce cost and delay. 
The cures I propose are surely more devastating to firms with “litigation” 
departments who bank their substantial incomes on leveraging teams of “litigat-
ing” lawyers for all cases from the large and complex to the small and simple. 
                                                        
85  Id. at 305. 
86  Id. at 291 (order of the court); id. at 301(stipulations for depositions); id. at 305 (stipula-
tions for interrogatories); id. at 310 (stipulations for requests for admissions). 
87  Baker v. John Morrell & Co., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1190–91 (N.D. Iowa 2003). 
88  Tracy Walters McCormack & Christopher John Bodnar, Honesty Is the Best Policy: It’s 
Time to Disclose Lack of Jury Trial Experience, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 155 (2010). 
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A recent extreme example of this law firm “leveraging” is a securities fraud 
class action lawsuit where one of the plaintiffs’ law firms was attempting to re-
cover $500.00 per hour for a “contract” lawyer hired for the case, which the 
firm was only actually paying $15.00 per hour.89 Federal trial court judges like-
ly see this leveraging in most major civil cases—I know I do. “[T]he predomi-
nant compensation model for law firms and lawyers also contributes to” exces-
sive discovery.90 “[M]ore time in discovery also means more revenue for the 
big firms.”91 In my experience, this encourages lawyers to engage in protracted 
and often useless discovery because “each additional hour of discovery trans-
lates into higher profits for the firm and higher hours (necessary to reap bonus-
es) for associates.”92 Another likely rationale for grossly excessive discovery is 
the endless search for “smoking gun” documents—the Holy Grail of discovery. 
The problem is, in my nearly forty years as a member of the bar, I have only 
seen two smoking gun documents in two unrelated cases and both were more 
than a quarter century ago while in private practice. Both were obtained fortui-
tously from third parties and not in discovery. Indeed, once I had these smoking 
guns (actually more like heat-seeking missiles), I asked the opposing parties, 
whose key level employees authored the documents, for them in multiple dis-
covery requests, without disclosing I had them. In each case, neither corpora-
tion produced them. Then, when I strategically disclosed them, they had the 
unmitigated gall of claiming I was hiding the ball. Their tune changed quickly. 
With all due respect to the hard-working federal judges, lawyers, and law 
professors who draft the Rules, they have not kept pace with the economics of 
the practice of law or the rise of the litigation industry and paper trials in lieu of 
civil jury trials. The Committee members spend enormous amounts of time, en-
ergy, and intellect nit-picking words in the Rules and nibbling around the edges 
of structural change. Yet, the failure of the Rules to implement much needed 
major structural changes make them more of the problem than part of any solu-
tion. Take for example, the years of effort and energy devoted by the Commit-
tee to the use of the word “shall” in Rule 56. In her fascinating and exceptional-
ly detailed analysis of the Committee’s schizophrenic approach to the word 
“shall” in Rule 56, Judge Lee Rosenthal spends seven pages of a law review 
article detailing the complex machinations, debates, extensive comments from 
the bench, bar, and academy over an eighteen-year period. She ultimately sim-
plifies this extraordinary effort by writing: “The Rule 56 text had gone from 
                                                        
89  In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 965 F. Supp. 2d 369, 398 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The court 
also reduced the “lodestar” request of $51.4 million to $25.1 million based on waste, ineffi-
ciency, inflated hourly rates, and unreasonable hours requested. See id. at 374. 
90  Wilson, supra note 8, at 179. 
91  Id. (footnote omitted). 
92  Jordan M. Singer, Proportionality’s Cultural Foundation, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 145, 
171 (2012) (citing Frank F. Flegal, Discovery Abuse: Causes, Effects, and Reform, 3 REV. 
LITIG. 1, 34–36 (1982)). 
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‘shall,’ to a proposal for ‘may,’ to ‘should,’ and back to ‘shall.’ ”93 My view is 
also shared by the major professional organizations for the civil defense bar 
who wrote, in their collective White Paper to the 2010 Duke Conference on 
Civil Litigation, concluding in an opening section on Prior Attempts to Solve 
Systemic Federal Litigation Problems, that: “While dissatisfaction undoubtedly 
exists with every legal system, we conclude that more than tinkering at the edg-
es of the Rules of Civil Procedure is required. Fundamental and meaningful re-
forms are essential to achieve effective justice in the federal system.”94 So what 
meaningful reforms hold a prospect for improvement? 
B. Bold Reforms 
1. The Simple Track 
I begin with a bold, but in my view, low-hanging fruit reform. It is way be-
yond time to end the “one size fits all” approach of the Rules. Professor Subrin 
has “argued for three decades that the underlying transsubstantive philosophy 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is flawed.”95 He is too gracious. This 
“one size fits all” approach, perhaps suitable in 1938, is now deeply flawed, and 
in my view, silly.96 It allows relatively simple fact disputes like the reasons to 
hire, fire, and fail to promote employees; the sale of piglets based on an alleged 
                                                        
93  Lee H. Rosenthal, The Summary Judgment Changes That Weren’t, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
471, 486 (2012). 
94  LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICEET AL., RESHAPING THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY: THE NEED FOR CLEAR, CONCISE, AND MEANINGFUL AMENDMENTS TO KEY 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE at ix (2010). 
95  Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 19, at 377. Professor 
Subrin defines “transsubstantive” to mean two things: 
the notion that the same procedural rules should be available for all civil law suits: (1) regardless 
of the substantive law underlying the claims, or “case-type” transsubstantivity; and (2) regard-
less of the size of the litigation or the stakes involved, or “case-size” transsubstantivity. I use the 
term “transsubstantive” to cover both. 
Id. at 378. Professor David Marcus explains: 
The trans-substantivity principle reduces complexity for a straightforward reason. It requires that 
the procedural treatment that the Federal Rules prescribe for simple contracts disputes mirrors 
exactly what applies in complicated employment discrimination litigation. Judges and lawyers 
do not need to relearn procedure every time they delve into a new field of substantive doctrine. 
David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Proce-
dure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 372 (2010). 
96  But see Marcus, supra note 95, at 426 (containing an excellent and comprehensive discus-
sion of trans-substantivity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a robust but candid 
defense of it). 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision to jettison a fifty-year-old interpretation of Rule 8 
and the rejuvenation of pleading litigation that the 1938 authors intended “to wither and die” 
show at a minimum that nothing is sacred in American civil procedure. The uncertain future of 
trans-substantivity, a “foundational assumption” of the 1938 rules, is further evidence of this 
fact. Although central to the design of American procedural systems since the early nineteenth 
century, the principle has taken a licking in recent years and potentially fatal cracks appear in its 
theoretical foundation. Nonetheless, trans-substantivity remains robust, if not as a jurisprudential 
matter, then as a practical matter, as the actions of rulemakers in the federal system demonstrate. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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oral contract; the strip search of a jail detainee (to describe just a few of my re-
cent civil jury trials) to mushroom into cases with extensive pretrial discovery, 
dispositive motions thicker than the Sioux City, Iowa phone book, and final 
pretrial orders with exhibit lists containing exhibits so numerous and irrelevant 
to the core issues that actually letting the lawyers use them in trial would inflict 
cruel and unusual punishment on the jurors. It is not that the issues raised in 
these cases are not über important, they are. I strongly believe they belong in 
federal court. But, they do not “generally warrant the whole panoply of federal 
process”97 contained in the Rules. In other words there is a difference between 
a “federal case” and a “FEDERAL CASE.” 
There is a better way, and it is some form of simple tracking. Professor 
Subrin has described the essential features of simple tracking as follows: 
x Trial date set shortly after lawsuit filed 
x Firm trial date in six to nine months 
x At most one required conference 
x Early setting of very limited discovery—two to three deposition and 
ten to fifteen interrogatories 
x More specificity in document requests 
x Consider eliminating mandatory disclosure 
x Consider time limits for trial98 
Many of the cases I have tried would have benefited from some form of 
simple tracking. Indeed, most of them would have. Most of the cases that settle 
would have settled sooner, with much less expense, if they had been subject to 
some form of mandatory simple tracking. I say “mandatory” because it is my 
understanding that very few cases ever opt in in those state and federal courts 
that make simple tracking voluntary. I suspect that is a result of “litigation 
think”—if one sides thinks it is a good idea, the other side automatically rejects 
it. That is why the Iowa Supreme Court recently adopted an Expedited Civil 
Actions rule where the plaintiff can require defendants to proceed with expedit-
ed procedures by waiving any right to recover more than $75,000.00.99 
                                                        
97  Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 19, at 399. 
98  Id. 
99  For example, the Iowa Supreme Court, after several years of study by an Iowa Civil Jus-
tice Reform Task Force, adopted in August of 2014 an Expedited Civil Action Rule, Iowa 
Court Rule, 1.281. See IOWA CIV. JUSTICE REFORM TASK FORCE, REFORMING THE IOWA CIVIL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 12–13 (2012). The Task Force was made up of leading members of the 
academy, plaintiff and defense counsel, corporate and public interest counsel and Iowa judg-
es. Id. at i. The Task Force was chaired by Iowa Supreme Court Justice Daryl L. Hecht. Id. It 
also received input from national experts like Rebecca Love Kourlis, Executive Director of 
the IAALS. Id. at 3. The thrust of the new rule is that plaintiffs who claim $75,000 or less 
can require the opposing parties to opt into an expedited process, which features: a guaran-
teed jury or bench trial date in one year or less; very limited motion practice including sub-
stantial limitations on filing summary judgment motions; substantial limitation on discovery, 
including one deposition of the opposing party and up to two more depositions of non-
parties; short time limits on the length of trials; enhanced admissibility of documents; and 
the admissibility of Health Care Provider Statements in lieu of testimony; and provisions for 
a non-unanimous 5-1 jury verdict after three hours of deliberation. See IOWA R. CIV. P. 
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While the devil is in the details, both Professor Subrin100 and I are content 
to let the drafters of the Rules fine tune the simple track rules, not the least of 
the problems is deciding which cases should be assigned to simple tracking. I 
agree with Gerry Spence that the notion that so many cases are complex is 
more about litigators trying a case than real trial lawyers. As I recently penned: 
Lawyers are great at taking a six-second automobile accident and morphing it 
into a two-week jury trial. An average lawyer makes simple events complicated, 
but great trial lawyers make complex events simple. [As Gerry Spence wrote]: 
I have tried cases with many exhibits, cases that took months in which 
scores of witnesses were called, cases with jury instructions as thick as 
the Monkey-Ward catalog and supposed issues as entangled as the Gor-
dian knot. But I have never tried a complex case. . . . All cases are re-
ducible to the simplest of stories.101 
2. Suggested Paradigm Switch for Criminal and Civil Discovery 
The most controversial big picture reform this essay suggests has its origin 
in the insightful observation, made more than two decades ago, by federal dis-
trict Judge H. Lee Sarokin and his co-author in their opening sentence of their 
law review article: “It is an astonishing anomaly that in federal courts virtually 
unrestricted discovery is granted in civil cases, whereas discovery is severely 
limited in criminal matters.”102 That is still true today. Money is usually the is-
sue in civil cases, and all parties receive enormous amounts of information 
from their adversaries in virtually wide-open, expensive, and time-consuming 
discovery. This is often marked by extraordinary judicial involvement in dis-
covery disputes. But, where individual liberty is at stake in criminal cases, dis-
covery is severely truncated by rule and extensive case law. In practice, there is 
virtually no judicial involvement in the criminal discovery process. At least not 
in our district, which, interestingly, has consistently been in the top ten of the 
ninety-four districts in the number of criminal cases per judge over the last dec-
ade.103 
                                                                                                                                
1.281. The Rule also allows for parties with claims of more than $75,000.00 to opt in to the 
Rule by consent. IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.281(f). 
100  Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 19, at 399. 
101  Bennett, supra note 46, at 9–10. 
102  H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent? Restrictions on Criminal 
Discovery in Federal Court Belie This Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1089, 1089 (1991). 
The thrust of Judge Sarokin’s article is to greatly expand federal criminal discovery, some-
thing that has not happened. See generally id. Professor Roberts has noted the “crux of the 
debate” about liberalizing criminal discovery “is captured in a seminal lecture published in 
1963” by Justice William Brennan. Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assis-
tance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1147 n.238 (2004) (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., Criminal Pros-
ecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279). 
103  See Federal Court Management Statistics Archive, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/FederalCourtManage
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Scholars have often noted the wide gap in discovery between civil and 
criminal cases.104 While “[m]any commentators, for many years, have called 
for the liberalization of criminal discovery statutes and rules,”105—a call I 
wholeheartedly agree with—my call is the opposite. I believe that civil discov-
ery should be severely limited and, indeed, switched with, or at least morphed 
toward, the limited criminal discovery. For a long time we have had discovery 
exactly backward: severely limited discovery in criminal cases and virtually 
wide-open discovery in civil cases. No doubt “[m]any criminal defense attor-
neys enjoy the fly-by-the-seat-of-your-pants experience that this scenario pro-
vides. It is challenging. It can be exciting. And in the end, it makes them better 
lawyers.”106 I certainly agree the best criminal defense lawyers are much better 
trial lawyers than the best civil trial lawyers. After all, in federal criminal cases, 
they must cross examine witnesses with no prior deposition of the witness, in-
terrogatories, and often not even a written statement to law enforcement offi-
cials by the witness. In those jurisdictions where the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3500, is strictly enforced, the prosecution is not required to produce a state-
ment “signed or otherwise adopted or approved by” the witness until after the 
prosecution witness has testified on direct examination.107 If there is no Jencks 
Act statement, the defense lawyer almost always has to cross-examine the wit-
ness cold, requiring skill very few civil litigators or civil trial lawyers have ever 
had to develop. 
The vast majority of criminal discovery in federal court is covered by Rule 
16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Rule, inter alia, requires 
the United States to disclose for inspection and copying upon request by the de-
fense the following: 1) any oral statements made by the defendant at any time 
that the prosecution intends to use at trial;108 2) any written or recorded state-
                                                                                                                                
mentStatistics_Archive.aspx (last visited May 5, 2015) (ranking federal district courts ac-
cording to the amount of criminal actions per judge). 
104  Robert L. Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV. 293, 
294 (1960) (noting in criminal cases “a long and deeply imbedded practice designed to keep 
the defendant in the dark as long as possible”); Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The In-
formation Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1091, 1106 (2014) (“Though 
scholarship has recognized a discovery disparity between civil and criminal litigants, what is 
most significant is the disparity’s nature—a criminal defendant is a passive recipient of in-
formation whereas a civil litigant exercises discretion to compel information from multiple 
sources.” (footnote omitted)); Jean Montoya, A Theory of Compulsory Process Clause Dis-
covery Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 845, 855–56 (1995) (noting that no criminal discovery procedures 
in state or federal courts match the broad discovery possibilities in civil procedure); Roberts, 
supra note 102, at 1098 (“Unlike rules governing discovery in civil cases, which require that 
the two sides exchange most information about their respective cases, criminal discovery 
results in a much more limited flow of information.” (footnote omitted)). 
105  Roberts, supra note 102, at 1098. 
106  W. Carl Lietz III, Trial by Ambush Should Be a Two-Way Street: The Federal Notice-of-
Alibi Rule and Mandatory Disclosure of Defense Witnesses, CHAMPION, July 2009, at 38. 
107  18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012). 
108  FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A). 
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ments by the defendant;109 3) documents or objects obtained by or belonging to 
the defendant, material to preparing the defense, or within the prosecution’s 
possession, custody or control;110 4) reports of examination or tests;111 and 5) 
any written summary of testimony of an expert witness.112 If the defendant re-
quests such discovery, then the defendant has a reciprocal obligation to produce 
documents and objects, reports of examination and tests, and a written sum-
mary of expected expert testimony at trial.113 
While state court criminal discovery varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 
Professor Ion Meyn provides this excellent overview: 
The typical criminal discovery statute does not grant a defendant formal 
pretrial investigatory power, defined as the discretion to compel facts from mul-
tiple sources. Formal investigatory powers may be expressed in various ways. In 
civil litigation, these powers take the form of depositions, interrogatories, and 
document requests. A criminal defendant, however, is rarely afforded such tools. 
He is instead entitled to discrete categories of opponent-sourced information 
found in the prosecutorial file.114 
Turning back to federal criminal discovery, virtually all criminal cases in 
our district opt out of Rule 16 discovery in favor of a “stipulated discovery or-
der.” This order provides both sides with greater information than Rule 16 
would provide and much earlier information than the Jencks Act provides. For 
example, it provides that both parties exchange witness and exhibit lists, in-
cluding Jencks Act material, with copies of exhibits, at least seven days prior to 
trial. It further provides that: 
The United States will include in its expanded discovery file or otherwise 
make available law enforcement reports (excluding evaluative material of mat-
ters such as possible defenses and legal strategies), grand jury testimony, and ev-
idence or existing summaries of evidence in the custody of the United States At-
torney’s Office, which provide the basis for the case against the defendant. The 
file will include Rule 16, Brady, and Jencks Act materials of which the United 
States Attorney’s Office is aware and which said Office possesses. Should the 
defendant become aware of any Brady material not contained in the expanded 
discovery file, the defendant will notify the United States Attorney’s Office of 
such materials in order that the information may be obtained.115 
The stipulated order further provides for reciprocal discovery from the de-
fense: “Upon disclosure of the United States’ discovery file, the defendant im-
mediately must provide, and will be under a continuing obligation to provide, 
disclosure of statements as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(1) & (2), and recip-
                                                        
109  FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(B). 
110  FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E). 
111  FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(F). 
112  FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(G). 
113  FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A)–(C). 
114  Meyn, supra note 104, at 1094. 
115  Stock Order Setting Jury Trial in Criminal Cases and Stipulated Discovery Order of the 
Northern District of Iowa, Western Division ¶ 1 (on file with author). 
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rocal discovery under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 16(b) and 26.2.”116 
Finally, the stipulated order provides: “For witnesses for whom there existed no 
statements or reports that were subject to disclosure through discovery, the par-
ty listing the witness also must note next to the witness’s name on the list the 
general purpose of his or her expected testimony.”117 
While our “stipulated discovery order” is technically voluntary, all lawyers 
on both sides always opt in. Once that is done, it becomes the mandatory vehi-
cle for reciprocal federal criminal discovery without any discovery motion 
practice and requires no court intervention. And this process is just not for 
those defendants who plead guilty, but works the same for those criminal cases 
that proceed to jury trial. Compared to most of the federal district courts, our 
district tries both a higher percentage and absolute number of criminal rather 
than civil jury trials. 
The lawyers on both sides of criminal cases take their reciprocal discovery 
duties very seriously. As a result, neither I, nor the three other Article III judges 
and two U.S. magistrate judges in our district have had a discovery dispute in a 
criminal case for years (one judge reported one dispute over the timing of the 
release of a single document a number of years ago). Of course, when I tried 
two federal death penalty cases nearly a decade ago that each lasted nearly 
three months, there were a plethora of discovery disputes.118 But death penalty 
cases, like true mega civil cases, are the exception not the rule, at least in our 
district and the vast majority of districts. This vast body of experience also sug-
gests that a “stipulated discovery” order works exceptionally well even in com-
plex criminal cases with multiple parties, dozens and dozens of witnesses and 
thousands of exhibits. 
The 1993 mandatory disclosure amendments to the Rules were deemed 
“radical” even by proponents.119 The rules imposed upon the parties “a duty to 
disclose, without awaiting formal discovery requests, certain basic information 
that is needed in most cases to prepare for trial or make an informed decision 
about settlement.”120 The origin of mandatory disclosure is often traced to arti-
cles by Wayne D. Brazil121 and Judge William W. Schwarzer.122 
                                                        
116  Id. ¶ 6. 
117  Id. ¶ 9. 
118  Mark W. Bennett, Sudden Death: A Federal Trial Judge’s Reflections on the ABA 
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cas-
es, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 391, 393 n.13 (2013) (citing thirty-four reported decisions in these 
two death penalty cases; some of which dealt with discovery related issues). 
119  Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Poli-
tics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 807 (1991) (quoting Paul Carrington, Reporter of 
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, in his cover memorandum accompanying the pro-
posed revisions to the federal rules (Feb. 22, 1990)). 
120  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note. 
121  Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals 
for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978). Then-Professor Brazil, later a distinguished 
U.S. magistrate judge, envisioned a discovery milieu where attorneys would view them-
selves more as officers of the court rather than as Rambo litigators. Id. at 1349. As such, 
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The 1993 amendments required initial mandatory disclosure of three basic 
types of information: 1) witnesses and documents; 2) experts and their opin-
ions; and 3) evidence to be used at trial.123 
Concerning documents, data compilations, and tangible things, the new 
mandatory disclosure rule required each party to, “without awaiting a discovery 
request, provide to other parties . . . a copy of, or a description by category and 
location of, all documents, data compilations, and tangible things in the posses-
sion, custody, or control of the party that are relevant to disputed facts alleged 
with particularity in the pleadings.”124 The new rule also required the parties to 
“make its initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably available 
to it,” and provided that the party “is not excused from making its disclosures 
because it has not fully investigated the case or because it challenges the suffi-
ciency of another party’s disclosures or because another party has not made its 
disclosures.”125 However, the 1993 amendments allowed district courts to opt 
out of these mandatory disclosure requirements.126 This loophole was closed by 
the 2000 amendment to Rule 26(a)(1).127 However, the significant loophole that 
allows the parties to completely avoid initial mandatory disclosure by stipula-
tion still exists and is undisturbed by the 2015 proposed amendments.128 
Thus, the major differences between the current discovery regime, even if 
modified by the proposed 2015 amendments, and my proposals are the follow-
ing: 1) no ability to stipulate away mandatory disclosure; 2) a strong presump-
tion of no additional discovery including depositions, interrogatories, request 
for production, and request for admissions; 3) no additional discovery could 
take place without court order and for “exceptional,” not “good,” cause—lest 
every litigator would yearn, whine, and request their usual discovery fare; and 
4) much stronger sanctions, especially suspension and revocation of law licens-
es in addition to monetary fines would be imposed for willful failure to disclose 
required mandatory disclosure in a timely fashion. Finally, and most important-
ly, the duty of mandatory disclosure would be substantially broadened to in-
                                                                                                                                
Brazil thought attorneys should be required under the rules to “search diligently for all data 
that might help resolve disputes fairly and to share voluntarily the results of their searches 
with both the court and other parties to the action.” Id. at 1349–50. 
122  William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Re-
form, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 703 (1989). Judge Schwarzer suggested amending the discovery 
rules to mandate prompt disclosure of all material documents and information by every party 
at the beginning of all cases. Id. at 721–22. Schwarzer’s proposal replaced traditional dis-
covery by the parties. Traditional discovery would be governed by court order, and only for 
good cause. Id. 
123  COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 99 (1991). 
124  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (1993). 
125  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(E). 
126  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note. 
127  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note. 
128  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(C). 
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clude all of the core information a party needs to make a reasoned decision to 
settle or go to trial. Mandatory disclosures would be required not only for in-
formation “that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defens-
es,”129 but for any information in the possession, custody, or control, or that a 
party has knowledge of that, borrowing from Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 16, “is material to preparing” the other party’s claim or defense. Of 
course, traditional privileges and attorney work product would be exempt from 
disclosure. 
Justice Scalia claimed in 1993 that the then-proposed initial mandatory dis-
closure provisions were subject to a parade of horribles: 
The proposed new regime does not fit comfortably within the American ju-
dicial system, which relies on adversarial litigation to develop the facts before a 
neutral decisionmaker. By placing upon lawyers the obligation to disclose in-
formation damaging to their clients—on their own initiative, and in a context 
where the lines between what must be disclosed and what need not be disclosed 
are not clear but require the exercise of considerable judgment—the new Rule 
would place intolerable strain upon lawyers’ ethical duty to represent their cli-
ents and not to assist the opposing side. Requiring a lawyer to make a judgment 
as to what information is “relevant to disputed facts” plainly requires him to use 
his professional skills in the service of the adversary.130 
None of Justice Scalia’s parade of horribles have come to pass. His predic-
tion that the “proposed radical reforms to the discovery process are potentially 
disastrous”131 was unmistakably more about crying wolf than correctly foretell-
ing the real impact of the amended rules. Perhaps Justice Scalia’s far off the 
mark predictions are due to his candid concession of “[n]ever having special-
ized in trial practice.”132 His dire doomsday predictions are no more likely to 
come to pass regarding the suggestions for reform in this essay.133 
I am not the only one who thinks that comprehensive and very early recip-
rocal, mandatory disclosure of documents should be required in civil litigation. 
In their recent April 15, 2015 report, the American College of Trial Lawyers 
                                                        
129  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i). 
130  AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 146 F.R.D. 401, 511 (1993) 
(Scalia, J. dissenting). 
131  Id. at 510. 
132  Id. at 513. 
133  One obvious criticism of my proposal is that federal criminal cases are sometimes initiat-
ed by the government after extensive and lengthy investigation and grand jury proceedings. 
On the other hand many federal criminal cases go to trial within the required seventy days 
from the arrest of a defendant because of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) 
(2012), with no prior government investigation before the defendants’ arrest. Also, unlike 
the need of the government to do a lengthy pre-indictment investigation to obtain documents, 
physical evidence and witness testimony from third parties—in the federal civil context most 
of the information needed for reciprocal discovery is in the parties’ possession. This makes 
feasible, mandatory reciprocal discovery in a relatively short period of time after the issues 
are joined. 
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and the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System jointly 
promulgated Principle 15, which states:  
Shortly after the commencement of litigation, each party should produce all 
known and reasonably available non-privileged, non-work-product documents 
and things that support or contradict specifically pleaded factual allegations. The 
parties should retain the right in individual cases to make a showing to the court 
that this initial production may not be appropriate or may need to be modified.134 
Principle 15 is much broader than the current mandatory disclosure under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.135 The current Rule requires description 
of documents by categories and location while this approach requires direct 
disclosure through production. Secondly, it is much broader because it requires 
early disclosure of all known and reasonably available documents and things 
that contradict “specifically pleaded factual allegations.”136 This disclosure 
must be both “meaningful and robust.”137 The rationale behind Principle 15 is 
very simple. Every “party should produce, without delay and without a formal 
request, documents that are known and reasonably available and that support or 
contradict specifically pleaded factual allegations.”138 This would incentivize 
“the parties to bring the facts and issues to light at the earliest opportunity, thus 
allowing the litigation process to be shaped by the true nature of the dispute.”139 
Thus, revolutionizing civil litigation by truly meeting the twin goal of reducing 
cost and delay. 
3. Case Protocols 
Expanding on Professors Burbank and Subrin’s suggestion for “discovery 
protocols,”140 this essay suggests going further with “case protocols.” I differ 
with the distinguished professors in suggesting “case protocols” be used not in 
the most expensive and burdensome discovery cases as they suggest (what my 
experience teaches are the true “mega cases”), but in the more routine cases 
                                                        
134  THE AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & CIVIL JUSTICE & THE 
INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., REFORMING OUR CIVIL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM: A REPORT ON PROGRESS AND PROMISE 19 (April 2015) [hereinafter REFORMING OUR 
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM], available at http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents 
/publications/report_on_progress_and_promise.pdf. 
135  Id. 
136  Id. 
137  Id. 
138  Id. 
139  Id. 
140  As Burbank & Subrin noted: 
Our second proposal again abandons transsubstantive procedure, which is usually ex-
pressed in flexible, non-confining language designed to accommodate high-stakes, complex cas-
es. We would encourage (or ask Congress to require) the rule makers to work with the bar to de-
velop discovery protocols for the types of litigation thought (or, preferably, found in empirical 
studies) to impose the most burdensome discovery costs. The protocols would permit lawyers to 
inform their clients about what to expect in certain case types and would permit judges to com-
pel or adjust the limitations in the protocol as necessary or appropriate for a particular case. 
Burbank & Subrin, Litigation and Democracy, supra note 19, at 412. 
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that better lend themselves to any type of protocols. I would suggest for start-
ers, employment discrimination including harassment, FLSA, ERISA, exces-
sive force, and breach of contract cases. These case protocols should be devel-
oped on a national basis by working groups of specialized plaintiff and defense 
lawyers from a cross section of geographic and small to BigLaw firms, U.S. 
magistrate and district court judges, and members of the legal academy. 
The case protocols could be utilized with or without the primary suggestion 
of greatly expanded mandatory disclosure or with simple tracking or both. Be-
cause these protocols are broader than “discovery protocols” they would in-
clude restrictions to reduce cost and delay by streamlining pleadings, discovery, 
motion practice, and trials. This could be implemented on an experimental ba-
sis to determine through empirical testing that it actually reduces cost and delay 
without shrinking the quality of justice. Simple tracking with or without case 
protocols does not mean second-class justice. “Less discovery for simple cases 
thus does not mean second-class justice for those cases. Rather, by reducing the 
breadth of discovery, we effectively reduce transaction costs and force lawyers 
to focus on the heart of the dispute.”141 This should be true for case protocols, 
as well. 
4. Dispositive Motion Reform 
Reforming motion practice is beyond the scope of this essay. Yet, I fully 
recognize it is one of the most difficult and important nuts to crack to assist in 
the twin goals of reducing cost and delay and reinvigorating real trials (as dis-
tinguished from motions to dismiss and summary judgment paper trials). In a 
prior recent essay, I fully elaborated my views on reforming summary judg-
ment.142 Professors Burbank and Subrin articulated summary judgment this 
way: 
We turn finally to an area of reform that lies close to the heart of our con-
cerns: summary judgment. This reform area forces one to look into the minds 
and hearts—the attitudes—of judges and lawyers. There is nothing obviously 
wrong with the governing Federal Rule 56 . . . [but] it is not clear how, at least 
on a transsubstantive basis, one could fashion a replacement that would prevent 
the mischief of ad hoc judgments that often appear arbitrary because of the 
amorphous nature of what constitutes an evidentiary foundation sufficient to 
support a jury finding. That mischief, confirmed by empirical study, consists of 
a supposedly uniform rule in fact operating in radically different fashion in dif-
ferent parts of the country and in different categories of cases, coupled with evi-
dence that in some cases the actual application of the rule has unfairly deprived 
litigants (usually plaintiffs) of a trial by jury or a trial in open court.143 
                                                        
141  Id. at 410. 
142  Bennett, supra note 2. 
143  Burbank & Subrin, Litigation and Democracy, supra note 19, at 412–13 (footnote omit-
ted). 
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With the rise of motion to dismiss practice, do we really need the elaborate 
summary judgment motion? In many cases, not the mega ones, which are the 
exceptions, it would be less expensive for the parties to try the case than motion 
it by avalanche. 
5. Trial by Agreement Reform 
The most promising civil litigation reform movement is one initiated ex-
clusively by trial lawyers. It is Trial by Agreement.144 This article is now re-
quired reading for all lawyers who file a civil case assigned to me. My Order 
Setting Jury Trial requires the lawyers to read the article and make a good faith 
effort to apply its principles to their civil case. The principles of Trial by 
Agreement—hard time limits, juror questions of witnesses, required prelimi-
nary jury instructions, and juror discussion of evidence before deliberations—
dramatically increase the effectiveness of trial and reduce its cost.145 The au-
thors of this article, renowned Texas trial lawyers Stephen D. Susman and 
Thomas M. Melsheimer summarize their Trial by Agreement concept this way: 
In the Susman approach, the crux of conducting a trial by agreement is to 
enter into a series of agreements designed not to advantage either side, but in-
stead to aid in an efficient and intelligent presentation of the case to the jury. 
There are other important benefits as well outside of the jury context, such as 
saving court resources by avoiding useless and time-consuming disputes, or re-
ducing the expenditure of fees and costs by both sides. . . . 
Many of the proposed agreements focus directly on the conduct of the trial 
itself. These agreements do not simply save time and reduce the costs associated 
with unnecessary disputes; they also result in a trial process that produces more 
intelligent and informed results. In that sense they are a substantive improve-
ment to the jury trial. 
This approach to trying a case can be seen as an exercise in improving law-
yer civility. By reducing the issues in dispute to what is truly material and out-
come determinative, attorneys eliminate fractious disputes that can disrupt the 
relationship between opposing counsel. But that laudatory outcome is a side 
benefit to the trial by agreement approach, not a primary goal. The goal is an 
improved jury trial.146 
The Trial by Agreement concept and philosophy has an important benefit 
because it “can be seen as an exercise in improving lawyer civility. By reducing 
the issues in dispute to what is truly material and outcome determinative, attor-
neys eliminate fractious disputes that can disrupt the relationship between op-
posing counsel.”147 
                                                        
144  Stephen D. Susman & Thomas M. Melsheimer, Trial by Agreement: How Trial Lawyers 
Hold the Key to Improving Jury Trials in Civil Cases, 32 REV. LITIG. 431 (2013). 
145  Id. at 441–62. 
146  Id. at 462–64 (footnotes omitted). 
147  Id. at 463. 
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The Trial by Agreement approach is particularly useful in eliminating the 
incredible time and expense most “litigators” generate in non-meritorious 
fighting over trial exhibits. Susman and Melsheimer write: 
One important practice concerns the treatment of exhibits. With competent 
trial counsel on both sides, there is no reason that agreements cannot be reached 
on all but a handful of exhibits. It should always be agreed, for example, that a 
document produced by either party is deemed authentic. Further, in connection 
with the exchange of proposed trial exhibits, any exhibit not objected to should 
be deemed admissible. 
We say “admissible” and not “deemed admitted” purposely. There are ap-
pellate risks inherent in simply “dumping” countless exhibits into evidence. This 
practice can provide a bloated and confused record on appeal. Consequently, the 
better practice is for counsel to offer the exhibits into evidence on at least a wit-
ness-by-witness basis to avoid an evidentiary “dump.”148 
Following this largely cooperative approach streamlines not only a jury tri-
al but the discovery process as well.149 An extremely important feature of the 
Trial by Agreement approach to civil litigation is in its sister: Pretrial Agree-
ments Made Easy.150 The whole approach of Pretrial Agreements Made Easy is 
that these extensive pretrial agreements “will make life easier for both sides and 
do not advantage one side over the other. Waiting until you are in the heat of 
battle to try to reach these agreements, one side or the other will feel disadvan-
taged.”151 
The Susman Pretrial Agreements Made Easy website contains and discuss-
es a dozen pretrial agreements from lawyer communication, deposition proce-
dures, to limiting in camera inspection of documents to twenty.152 
The enormous significance of the Susman and Melsheimer approach is that 
until litigators figure out that mutual cooperation advances their clients interest 
and reduces cost and delay, no amount of amending the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure will have a significant real world impact. 
CONCLUSION 
Past reformers have been unsuccessful in solving the enduring problem of 
excessive cost and delay in federal civil litigation. Prior reformers seemed to 
believe that hope in the periodic amendments of the Rules would triumph over 
experience. It has not. Unless the problems created by the explosion in the “lit-
                                                        
148  Id. (footnote omitted). 
149  A very recent joint report by the American College of Trial Lawyers and the Institute for 
the Advancement of the American Legal System suggest that “[c]ooperation and communi-
cation between counsel is critical to the speedy, effective, and inexpensive resolution of dis-
putes in our civil justice system.” REFORMING OUR CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 134, at 
11. 
150  Stephen Susman, Pretrial Agreements Made Easy, TRIAL BY AGREEMENT (May 4, 2011), 
http://trialbyagreement.com/pretrial-agreements/pretrial-agreements-made-easy/. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
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igation industry” are tackled, meaningful reform will not happen. The sweeping 
changes proposed in this essay would dramatically reduce the cost of pro-
cessing a case through trial; severely punish lawyers who knowingly hide the 
ball on critical evidence; induce cases to settle earlier with less “litigation,” dis-
covery, and transactional costs to the parties; require less, not more, judicial in-
tervention; increase the demand for skilled trial lawyers while reducing the de-
mand for “litigators,” and incrementally, but importantly, reverse the trend 
“that users increasingly do not expect or even want a trial.”153 
I fully understand that the suggestions for a major overhaul of the civil jus-
tice system are not going to be supported, endorsed or adopted by the “litiga-
tion industry,” or the Committee, or perhaps anyone else, let alone those with 
strong financial interests or cultural bias toward the litigation industry. This es-
say has more realistic and modest goals: to arouse members of the Committee, 
academy, judges, and lawyers to think more creatively to solve the enduring 
problems of excessive cost and delay in our civil justice system and, in the pro-
cess, invigorate trial by jury.154 Most importantly, the emerging Trial By 
Agreement movement can transform right now simple and complex cases, 
without the need for years of complex rules reform, to dramatically reduce cost 
and delay—and it is trial lawyer driven. For this the Grand Poobah will be eter-
nally grateful. 
                                                        
153  Hornby, supra note 21, at 461. 
154 Invigorating trial by jury is critically important to me and in my view our civil justice sys-
tem. See Mark W. Bennett, Reinvigorating and Enhancing Jury Trials Through an Overdue 
Juror Bill of Rights: WWJW—What Would Jurors Want?—A Federal Trial Judge’s View, 38 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming Fall 2016). 
